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EXECUTIVE COMMANDEERING OF
STRIKE-BOUND PLANTS
IN the interest of national defense, Congress has acted to mobilize American
manpower, industry and wealth.1 But national preparedness has been hin-
dered by industrial disputes which have divided loyalties, sapped morale
and destroyed the harmony essential to a rapidly expanding production
program.2 At the inception of the defense effort, both the Conciliation Ser-
vice of the Department of Labor 3 and the Labor Division of the National
Defense Advisory Commission 4 intervened, with some success, in critical
labor situations. 5 But the riing tide of strikes in industries vital to defense
overwhelmed these mediatory bodies0 and the National Defense Mediation
Board was created.7 This Board, however, has been powerless to enforce
1. See Comments (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 250, 266, 285.
2. See Kellor, Divide and Conquer, The Menace of Disputtes to Natlonal Defenise
(1941) 5 APB. J. 132; Young, Mobilization of Volnlary Arbitration Resources (1941)
5 APB. J. 139, 145. See also THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD (BULLETIN or BU~t:AU
OF LABOR STATISTICS) (1922) 9-26.
3. The Secretary of Labor may mediate in labor disputes and may appoint comi-
missioners of conciliation when, in her judgment, the interests of industrial peace so
require. 37 STAT. 738 (1913), 29 U. S. C. § 51 (1934). See Steelman, Conciliatllo
and Anterican Defense (1941) 5 ARB. J. 146.
4. The Act of August 29, 1916, 39 STAT. 649 (1916), 50 U. S. C. § 1 (1934),
creates the Council of National Defense and establishes an Advisory Commission of not
more than seven members. On May 29, 1940, the members of the Commission Were
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Council. It is the pturpose
of the Commission to facilitate production for military needs, investigate the obstacles
to production and make recommendations to the executive department. Prentice-Hall
National Def. Serv. 111132 (1941). Commissioner Hillman, the labor representative,
set up an advisory committee of represeptatives of national labor unions to assist him
with labor problems in defense industries and to act as mediators. N. Y. Times, Jan, 3,
1941, p. 23, col. 1; id., Jan. 13, 1941, p. 1, col. 6.
5. E.g., International Harvester Co., N. Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1941. p, 10, col. 4,
Eaton Mfg. Co., id., Jan. 15, 1941, p. 1, col. 7; Republic Steel Corp., id., Jail. 24, 1941,
p. 8, col. 1.
6. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 19,500,000 man-days were lost
by strikes during the first nine months of 1941. This represents an increase of five
times over the same period in 1940 during which 4,854,523 man-days were lost. 8 LAI).
REL. REP. 183, 363, 535, 699, 855 (1941) ; 9 id. at 2, 135 (1941). The main causes for
these strikes are the increased strength of unions, the growing profits of industry an(d
the rising cost of living. TOBIN AND BIDWELL, MOBILIZING CIVILIAN AMEuCA (1940)
115-23. For comparison with World War experience, see Gregg, The National ar
Labor Board (1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 39.
7. Exec. Order No. 8716, March 19, 1941. 1 Prentice-Hall Lab. Serv. ff3155
(1941). The Board consists of three representatives of the public, four of labor and
four of industry. N. Y. Times, March 20, 1941, p. 1, cols. 6-7. A companion mediatory
agency, the Labor Division of the OPM was later created to cooperate with other
federal agencies in the adjustment of labor problems. 1 Prentice-Hall Lab, Serv. ff3165
(1941).
EXECUTIVE COMMANDEERING
the recommendations" it may make in disputes certified by the Secretary
of Labor.9 Force of public opinion and threat of commandeering by the
President are the only sanctions available. In three of the major industrial
controversies these two compulsions have not been successful in securing
settlements, and actual seizures have been made. Such presidential action
raises two problems: first, on what basis may the commandeering order
itself be sustained and, secondly, what should be done with plants once they
have been commandeered?
The most important instance of executive commandeering occurred at the
Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Kearny, New Jersey.o
Prior to the expiration of an existing collective bargaining contract, repre-
sentatives of management and of the International Union of Mfaritime and
Shipbuilding Workers agreed upon many of the provisions to be embodied
in the contract for the ensuing year. But the issues of reclassification of
employees and of the union shop remained unsettled. Continued negotia-
tions failed to break the stalemate and, since Federal played an important
role in the shipbuilding program, the Secretary certified the controversy to
the National Defense Mediation Board. On the labor front the dispute had
then become a testing ground for the issue of the dosed shop in the entire
coastal shipbuilding area." On July 26, 1941, a panel of the Mediation
Board12 recommended that the Company accept a modified union shop in
the form of a union maintenance clause' 3 providing that "any employee
S. In this respect the Board is like the National War Labor Board of 1918.
ToBiN AND BmwEu, op. cit. spra note 6, at 118.
9. The Board may mediate only when the Secretary of Labor certifies that a dis-
pute threatens to obstruct the production of materials essential to national defense and
that a settlement cannot be reached by Labor Department Conciliators. Exec. Order No.
8716, March 19, 1941. 1 Prentice-Hall Lab. Serv. ff3155 (1941).
10. The Company has $450,000,000 in defense contracts. N. Y. Times, Aug. 7,
1941, p. 1, col. 1. For a detailed account of this dispute, see N. Y. Times, Aug. 7-Nov.
2, 1941.
11. These yards have traditionally been conducted on an open shop basis. N. Y.
Times, Aug. 8, 1941, p. 1, col. 3. The National War Labor Board of 1918, in its
declaration of principles, froze the closed shop issue for the duration of the var. Tnr
NATioxAL WNVA LAboR BoARD, op. cit. s pra note 2, at 32-33. The War Department
has recently proposed legislation which is a virtual guaranty of the open shop. N. Y.
Times, June 19, 1941, p. 13, col. 1.
12. XV. P. Stacey, Chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, representing
the public, and J. B. Carey, Secretary of the CIO, representing the union, constituted
the majority. C. E. Adams, President of Air Reduction Company, representing manage-
ment, dissented. N. Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1941, p. 9, cols. 1-4.
13. As of Sept. 1, 1941, thirty-six cases considered by the Mediation Board involved
a demand for union security. Half of these were settled without incorporating any
such provision. Union security provisions were granted in the other half, eight by
agreement between the parties and the rest by Board recommendations. A closed shop
as recommended only in the Bethlcheim Steel Comnpany case, because all other Pacific
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who is now a member of the Union or who hereafter voluntarily becomes
a member during the life of this agreement shall, as a cofidition of con-
tinued employment, maintain membership in the Union in good standing. '1 4
The Union first rejected, but later accepted this proposal. When the Comn-
pany refused to comply and asserted that, as a matter of principle, it could
not adopt a recommendation so closely approximating the closed shop,16 a
strike resulted.16 Further mediatory efforts by state and federal authorities
were unavailing,17 and both disputants urged the Government to seize and
operate the plant. Acting under presidential orders, the Secretary of the
Navy took possession of the shipyard on August 23 and proclaimed that
control would be retained until the property could be operated in a manner
"consistent with national defense."
EXECUTIVE POWER TO COMMANDEER
Executive orders directing seizure of plants may draw upon two major
reservoirs of authority, one statutory, the other constitutional. At present,
however, no statute is precisely applicable. Although some World War
legislation survives, it is so limited that it is not suited to current needs.18
By the Act of June 26, 1940, the Executive was authorized to commandeer
plants whenever he deemed it necessary to national defense and whenever
Coast'shipyards had accepted a master agreement providing for operations on a closed
shop basis. NATIONAL ASSOcIATON OF MANUFACTURERS' LAw D1GEsT (Sept. 1941)
121-25.
14. The validity of the union maintenance clause within the National Labor Relations
Act has been placed in issue. Section 8(3) of the Act, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(3) (Supp. 1939), states that nothing in the language of the statute shall be
construed to prohibit an employer from making an agreement with a bona fide labor
organization "to require as a condition of employment membership therein." It has
been said that this mandate is "not limited to the usual closed shop." NLRB v. Electric
Vacuum Cleaner Co., 120 F. (2d) 611, 615 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941). See opinion of
R. B. Watts, general counsel for NLRB, 9 LAn. REL. RE'. 81 (1941). An employer's
refusal to agree to a closed shop proposal, if he is otherwise willing to bargain lit
good faith, is not an unfair labor practice. Adams Bros. Manifold Printing Co., 17
N. L. R. B. 974 (1939); Cullom & Ghertner Co., 14 N. L. R. B. 270 (1939).
15. Statement of Pres. L. H. Korndorff. N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1941, p. 15, cols. 3-5,
16. The Atlantic Coast Zone Shipbuilding Stabilization Agreement, negotiated by
representatives of OPM, employers and employees, and barring strikes and lockouts
for a period of two years, was not breached since it was ineffective until incorporated
into the new collective bargaining contract. N. Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1941, p. 9, cols. 1-4;
id., Aug. 10, 1941, p. 35, col. 6.
17. Governor Edison of New Jersey vainly offered state mediatory facilities to the
parties. N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1941, p. 1, cols. 4-5. A personal appeal by President
Roosevelt for the immediate resumption of work was ineffectual. N. Y. Times, Aul,
20, 1941, p. 40, col. 5. Direct negotiations between the parties broke (town. N. Y,
Times, Aug. 23, 1941, p. 11, col. 3.
18. 39 STAT. 213 (1916), 50 U. S. C. § 80 (1934) (in time of war or when war
is imminent) ; 39 STAT. 1192 (1917), 50 U. S. C. §82(b) (1934) (in time of war).
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he was "unable to arrive at an agreement with the owner for its use and
operation."' 9 But this provision was expressly repealed by Section 9 of
the Selective Service Act of 1940 which permitted seizure of manufacturing
facilities only where the owners refused to give preference to Government
orders or to accept them at reasonable prices as determined by executive
officers.20 Because of the narrowing effect of the later statute, the Govern-
ment has been reluctant to justify its action solely upon this basis3'
The second source of power is the constitutional authority inherent in
the office of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the nation's armed
forces.2 This power, however, has never been precisely defined, because
it cannot be; its extent depends largely upon the conditions and circum-
stances obtaining when it is utilized.2 While extraordinary times may not
enlarge existing authority or create new power, they do furnish occasion
for exercising powers previously dormant.2 The presidential declaration
of an unlimited national emergency would be significant in a judicial deter-
mination of the existence of such a crisis now.Y Broad authority to com-
mandeer may be derived from the view- that the President need find no
specific authorization for acts essential to national safety, his discretion being
unlimited except for express constitutional or statutory restrictions. -3 Ac-
19. Pub. L. No. 671, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 28, 1940) § 8(b). This provision
was enacted without the knowledge of many Congressmen. See S6 Co,.r. REe. 1391
et seq. (1940).
20. Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 16, 1940) § 9.
21. It has been suggested that authority under the Selective Service Act be cum-
bined with that conferred "by various other acts to get a legal basis." N. Y. Times, March
22, 1941, p. 6, col. 7; id., April 5, 1941, p. 1, col. 1.
22. CoRwrN, THE PREsIDENT, Orrc AND POWERS (1940) 155, 158; Kester, The
War Indiestries Board, 1917-1919: A Study in Industrial Mlobilication (1940) 34 AZT.
Poi- Scr. REv. 655, 677; Culp, Executive Power in Emergencies (1933) 31 Mica. L.
Ray. 1066.
23. See United States v. Kraus, 33 F. (2d) 406, 409 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); United
States v. Powers, 274 Fed. 131 (W. D. Mich. 1921) ; United States v. Gordon, 287 Fed.
565 (S. D. Ohio 1922). "The right to take specific action might not exist under one
state of facts, while under another it might be the absolute duty of the Executive to
take such action." Letter from Attorney-General 'Murphy to 'Senate, Oct. 4, 1939.
Prentice-Hall National Def. Serv. f 1051 (1940); 1 Bus. and Def. Coordinator UT. 1
(1941).
24. Cf. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 523-29 (1935); Hull,
Some Legal Aspects of Federal Control of Railways (1918) 31 HAnv. L. R'. E9,
862. See further JoHxsEx, INcREASING THE PREstDE.r's POWER (1933); SX-ALL, SO"%
PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATioNs OF THE PaRESmF'c (1932) 11; Davenport, The Growing
Power of the Presidency (1934) 14 B. U. L. REv. 655.
25. Prentice-Hall National Def. Serv. 301 (1941).
26. Acting under this theory, President Theodore Roosevelt planned to take over
the anthracite coal mines during the strike of 1902. RoosEMr, AuTomoan.%uH, (1926)
38-89, 474-76; BERmAx, LAWR DIsPUrEs AND THE PRESIDENT Or THE UNIwTE SThTm
(1924) 46-58.
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ceptance of this position is the main reason that no legislation clarifying the
power of the President to seize strike-bound plants has yet been passed. '37
Under it such legislation is unnecessary.28 According to the contrary view,
however, the President holds office under law specifically prescribing his
duties and thus to commandeer property he must have specific legislative
authorization.
2 9
A related aspect of presidential authority as chief of the armed forces,
the power of compulsory requisitioning, may afford legal basis for com-
mandeering. The Government's power to requisition military supplies has
long been recognized.30 There. must, of course, be subsequent payment of
just compensation. While this power has been construed strictly and has
been exercised only in war time, it is sufficiently broad to apply to cases
of grave national peril as well.8' The doctrine is essentially a recognition
that the sovereign state may take whatever steps are necessary for self-
preservation.3 2 This type of seizure, even in time of war, has been sharply
criticized on the ground that commandeering property is an aspect of the
legislative power of eminent domain and cannot be exercised by the Executive
in the absence of Congressional authorization.
33
Doubt surrounding the legal justification for commandeering can obviously
be most effectively removed by legislation specifically directed to the problem.
The bills recently proposed in Congress grant broad authority to the Presi-
dent to seize plants in which production has been halted by labor disputes.
27. The bills were proposed as amendments to the Selective Service Act and would
have empowered the President to seize factories when the Secretaries of War or Navy
certified that there was "an existing or threatened failure of production" hampering the
defense program. See, e.g., H. R. 4257 (Vinson). 1 Prentice-Hall Lab. Serv. 513
(1941). For discussion, see N. Y. Times, June 8-July 11, 1941.
28. This was the view taken by the Administration and by many Republicans. N. Y.
Times, June 11, 1941, p. 14, col. 3; id., July 11, 1941, p. 7, col. 5. See 87 CoN . Rwc,
APPENDIX 3200 (1941).
29. See TAFT, THE PRESIDENCY (1916) 122, 125, 126.
30. United States v. Smith, 39 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930); United States
v. McFarland, 15 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore
& Tierney, 265 Fed. 177, 179 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 498 (1920).
31. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909) ; United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623
(U. S. 1871); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 133-35 (U. S. 1851). The power
does not extend beyond the seizure and use of private property to meet the occasion.
Hull, loc. cit. supra note 24.
32. WAR POLICIES Comm. HEARINGS, H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess,
(1931) 412.
33. Cf. DuPont v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456, 462 (1928) ; North Carolina R. R. v. Lee,
260 U. S. 16, 17 (1922); Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 99, 102 (S. D.
N. Y. 1919). For assertion that President has no implied power to requisition, see
BARUCH, AmERIcAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR (1941) 445-47. But cf. attitudes of
Ex-Secretary of War N. D. Baker and P. V. McNutt. WAR POLICIES COMM. HrAtINGS,
H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931) 123, 212. See Kester, supra note 22,
at 678.
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They further provide for a more powerful mediation board authorized to
order "cooling-off" periods in cases of threatened work stoppages and pro-
vide for penalties against employees who disobey its orders by withdrawal
of the protection of certain social legislation.34
EXAMPLES OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMANDEERING
Notwithstanding the doubtful legal basis of the commandeering power, it
has already been more extensively used in the present emergency than in
past crises. The experience at Kearny has been the most outstanding
example. A further instance occurred when employees of North American
Aviation Corporation breached an agreement not to strike while negotiations
for a collective bargaining contract were in progress. Under presidential
order, armed forces seized the plant so that men desiring to work might
do so. 35 The seizure, however, was largely technical since physical possession
of the plant was returned to corporate officials when it appeared that the
union would not obstruct an amicable settlement. More recently, when the
Mlediation Board's recommendation was not accepted, the Army seized for
purposes of operation the plant of Air Associates, Incorporated, a strategic
link in the chain of national defense.36
World War experience does not offer strong precedent for current acts
of seizure by the Government. There were only three instances of com-
mandeering during the war period, two of wlich were specifically authorized
by statute. The railroads were seized and operated under Congressional
direction,3 7 as were communication companies.3s The strongest precedent
for present commandeering is the case of the Smith and Wesson Arms
Company. When that Company refused to accept an award of the National
34. Restrictive legislation has received the endorsement of the President. See
N. Y. Times, Nov. 20-Nov. 30, 1941.
35. June 9, 1941, Exec. Order No. 8773, C. C. H. War Law Serv. 9517 (1941).
For history of this dispute, see N. Y. Times, June 6-July 9, 1941.
36. As in the case of the North American Aviation Corporation, United States
Army troops were dispatched to police the plant. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1941,
p. 14, col. 2; id., Oct. 31, 1941, p. 1, col. S; N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Oct. 10, 1941, p. 10,
col. 1.
37. 39 STAT. 645 (1916), 10 U. S. C. § 1361 (1934) (designed with reference to
threatened strikes imperilling troops in Mexico). Executive seizure was affirmed by
the passage of the Federal Control Act, 40 STAT. 451 (191S). Its legality seems un-
questioned. Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554 (1921); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 142 (1919). See Aitchison, lar Tie Control of
American Railways (1940) 26 VA. L. REv. 847; (1935) 83 U. or PA. L Rmm 62, 655.
38. 40 STAT. 904, 1807 (1918). See Dakota Cent. TeL Co. v. South Dakota, 250
U. S. 163, 183 (1919) ; cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135 (1919) ;
40 STAT. 1872 (1918). See Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 99 (S. D. N. Y.
1918), rev'd and disnissed as mwot, 250 U. S. 360 (1919); (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. Rev.
662, 666; (1919) 28 YA.E L. J. 513.
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War Labor Board30 providing that it cease exacting yellow-dog contracts,
40
the Army took possession of the plant under a statute similar to Section 9
of the Selective Service Act.41 The validity of the seizure, however, was
never litigated.
PROCEDURAL METHODS FOR CHALLENGING COMMANDEERING
When both labor and management urge that Government assume control
of a plant, as they did at Kearny, it is unlikely that the validity of presi-
dential commandeering will be questioned. Yet even these seizures may be
legally attacked by stockholders. Minority stockholders have traditional
remedies to protect corporations from directors' fraud, gross mismanage-
ment and illegal or ultra vires acts. 42 While consent by directors to a com-
mandeering order is scarcely a fraudulent or an ultra vires act, it may be
called either gross mismanagement or an illegal act. A court might find
that directors had breached their trust, so as to be guilty of mismanagement,
by submitting to the commandeering order and allowing an illegal disposi-
tion of corporate property with resultant injury to the shareholders' pro-
prietary interest. Where commandeering is requested by directors, as at
Kearny, the shareholders' case becomes even stronger.
43
In instances where presidential commandeering is met by objections of
management, resort to the courts is, cf course, much more probable. The
corporation itself may then have a remedy if the directors desire to litigate
the validity of the commandeering order in a suit personally against the
departmental head carrying it out.44 Since Executive Orders are not avail-
39. This Board was created by Presidential proclamation when strikes were alarm-
ingly on the increase. The war powers of the executive, the need for uninterrupted
production and the full representation of all disputants on the Board were relied upon
to secure compliance with its orders. See Gregg, supra note 6, at 40, 45; Marshall,
The War Labor Program and Its Administration (1918) 26 J. OF POL. Ecox. 425,
432, 437.
40. The award nullified the decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U. S. 229 (1917), forbidding unions to organize employees who had signed such con-
tracts. See BERMAN, op. cit. stepra note 26, at 152; N. Y. Times, July 12-Oct. 8, 1918,
The Board's vigorous action greatly enhanced its prestige. See THE NATIONAL WVn,
LABOR BOARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 260; Gregg, supra note 6, at 55.
41. 39 STAT. 213 (1916), 50 U. S. C. §80 (1934).
42. 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1932) §§ 5823-28, 5289, n1. 44;
16 id. § 7714.
43. Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 320 (1936) (stockholder may question
validity of government demands); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922) (refusal of
directors to resist enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional act is disregard of duty
rather than mere mistake of judgment); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157
U. S. 429, 553 (1895) (voluntary payment of unconstitutional tax out of corporate funds
is breach of trust).
44. The officer may be regarded as acting under authority not validly conferred.
Franklin Twp. v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 208, 212 (App. D. C. 1936).
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able as a defense to the transgressing officer unless validly issued,45 the act
of commandeering may be directly challenged in such an action.
ULTIMATE DIsPOSITION OF COMMANDEERED PROPERTY
In the ultimate disposition of the Kearny shipyard, the Navy Department
has indicated that one of three procedures will be adopted: outright purchase
and operation by the Government; operation by a Government corporation
under a lease from the original owner; or purchase coupled with operation
by a private corporation under a lease from, or a management contract with,
the Government. 46 Whichever of these devices for control the Government
selects, operation of commandeered industries raises several serious legal
and practical difficulties.
Personnel. A necessary consideration in any program of widespread com-
mandeering followed by extensive Government operation is the supply of
capable business executives available to replace private management. 47 Dur-
ing the World War, lack of such men sharply deterred wide-scale seizures.4 3
A policy of replacing heads of commandeered plants only where their
presence was absolutely incompatible with Government objectives was con-
sequently adopted.4 9 In recent years, however, Government personnel has
been schooled in the operation of shipyards, arsenals and aircraft factories
so that more trained executives are now availableY0° But even today it will
be extremely difficult to carry out e-xtensive operations with Government
personnel. Thus a policy of retention of private management wherever
possible may be anticipated.51
Compensation. A second element in formulating a policy of farflung com-
mandeering is the requirement that adequate compensation be paid for plants
45. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137 (U. S. 1851); Little Y. Barreme, 2
Cranch 170, 178-79 (U. S. 1S04).
46. 9 L.. Rm- REP. 84-85 (1941); Bvsmirss WEEK, Sept. 27, 1941, p. 6.
47. The Secretary of the Navy named Admiral H. G. Bowen, Chief of the Bureau
of Engineering of the Navy Department, to take charge of the Kearny shipyard. Presi-
dent L. H. Korndorff and several other high-ranking executives have been removed.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1941, p. 17, col. 4; id., Aug. 25, 1941, p. 9, col. 3; id., Aug. 27, 1941,
p. 1, col. 3.
48. See Comment (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 266, 276-77.
49. Presidential commandeering proclamations during the World War provided that
the officials, boards of directors and employees should remain at work. 40 STAT. 1733
(1917) (railroads) ; 40 STAT. 1807 (1918) (wire systems). In the case of the railroads,
Government personnel discharged important management functions. See discussion in
Aitchison, supra note 37, at 873. A dummy federal operating company replaced private
management at the Smith and Wesson Arms Co. N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1918, p. 18, col. 8.
50. Comment (1940) 50 YA=E L. J. 266, 277 and n. 74.
51. In an effort to secure a management that would not have labor troubles, the
War Department conditioned the return of Air Associates, Inc. to private owners upon
the resignation of F. L. Hill, President, and H. I. Crowe, Vice-President. N. Y. Times,
Nov. 20, 1941, p. 1, col. 2; id., Nov. 27, 1941, p. 7, cols. 1-3.
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seized. 52 The power to commandeer property is subject to the same limita-
tions as the power of eminent domain. 3 World War statutes generally
provided that fair rental and adequate compensation should be decided by
the Executive, and allowed dissatisfied claimants to resort to the Court of
Claims.54 Availability of judicial review has been held necessary to accord
with constitutional requirements.r5 The Selective Service Act of 1940, which
is the only declaration on the subject today, simply provides that rentals
for commandeered plants shall be "just and fair." 0, But the absence of any
provision for judicial review of the adequacy of compensation will not bar
claimants from the courts.57 Most problems arising from the requirement
of judicial review may, of course, be eliminated by contracts between the
Government and the corporations concernedY8
Present judicial criteria for valuation in eminent domain seem at best
an outmoded method for determining governmental liability where large
business enterprises are commandeered. As applied to industries, the concept
of fair market value at the time of seizure"0 is void of meaning. Not only
is there no market of willing buyers and willing sellers trading in going
concerns, but even a hypothetical market must at the time of seizure be
measured in a period of inflated prices.0 More adequate criteria for valua-
52. United States v. McFarland, 15 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Cohn, The
Power of the United States in War Time (1919) 53 Air. L. Rzv. 87, 97-98. See United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co.,- 255 U. S.- 81, 88 (1921) (constitutional requirement of
just compensation not suspended by grave national peril).
53. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 343 (1923) (fill
money equivalent for property taken must be paid); West v. Chesapeake and Potomac
Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 671 (1935) (just compensation is value at time of taking).
54. The claimant received a fixed percentage of the amount determined by the gov-
ernmental officer and could sue for such further sum as would provide just compensa-
tion. See, e.g., 39 STAT. 1193 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 82(b) (1934) (50 per cent)
40 STAT. 279 (1917) (75 per cent).
55. United States v. National City Bank of New York, 275 Fed. 855 (S. . N. Y.
1921) (Congress cannot determine just compensation finally by statute).
56. Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 16, 1940) § 9.
57. When the Government appropriates private property for public use, a contract
to pay the value of the property taken is implied. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co,,
112 U. S. 645, 656-57 (1884). Since the property would not be taken in an eminent do-
main proceeding and the value Would be determined after seizure, the claim falls
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. 36 STAT. 1136 (1911), 24 STAT. 505
(1887), 28 U. S. C. § 250(1) (1934); Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341 (1927).
58. Compare the contracts with the wire companies in the last war. N. Y. Times,
Oct. 7, 1918, p. 12, col. 6; id., Oct. 10, 1918, p. 16, col. 2. On the special statutory treat-
ment of the railroads, see Aitchison, supra note 37, at 871-76.
59. This is the test applied in eminent domain cases. Olson v. United States, 292 V.
S. 246 (1934). But some courts may be willing to relax the rule when values are unusu-
ally inflated. Howell v. State Highway Dep't, 167 S. C. 217, 223, 166 S. E. 129, 132
(1932).
60. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DoIAIN (1936) § 186;
BARUCH, op. cit. supra note 33, at 79,
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tion might be found, by analogy with current practices in corporate reor-
ganizations, in the going concern value of the business. The courts have
nevertheless insisted upon a full and perfect money equivalent in terms of
market value at the time of seizure0' and thus inadvertently endorsed profit-
eering.
Labor. Labor relations become a paramount factor in formulating plans
for Government operation of commandeered property. Commandeering in
the present crisis has been provoked by labor strife debilitating the produc-
tive process. Thus the highly controversial issues arising from labor disputes
are inextricably interwoven with the problem of operating the seized plant.
The type of plan devised by the Government may have a profound influence
on the union's status. If adverse to the interests of a labor group, coopera-
tion may become impossible and the primary objective of resuming prodtc-
tion more remote than ever.
02
In privately owned plants leased by Government corporations, changes in
union status may be insignificant. Controversies over union shops and related
matters may be suspended until the emergency has passed and the Mediation
Board's recommendations observed.63 During a short term period, this solu-
tion may have the advantage of preserving the position of organized labor.
But if the property is purchased and operated by the Government, labor
relations may be disrupted. Employees may be subjected to civil service
rules; unions may not be recognized.04 In this event, recommendations of
the Board would become meaningless.03
61. Vogelstein v. United States, 262 U. S. 337 (1923) (fair worth in view of exist-
ing market conditions and not value in a fair market). For contrary View, see Borland
& Emerson v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 411, 417 (1922) (concurring opinion).
62. The union maintenance clause was granted to the union in the Kcarny case
pending decision upon the ultimate fate of the property. While it was thought unlikely
that the union would invoke the clause, demand has been made upon the Mediation Board
for the discharge of eighteen members, with a strike as the alternative. N. Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1941, p. 9, col. 1; Busi,_ss WEEK, Sept. 17, 1941, p. 66; N. Y. World-Tele-
gram, Nov. 10, 1941, p. 3, col. 1.
63. 9 LAB. REL. REP. 85 (1941). Such a verbal understanding would find prece-
dent in the Panama R. R. Steamship Co. This agency of the War Department mans all
its ships through the hiring halls of a union, although there is no written contract. N. Y.
Times, Aug. 25, 1941, p. 9, col. 3.
64. N. Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1941, p. 13, col. 1. By the Executive Order of Dec. 7,
1913, all artisan and supervisory artisan positions in the Navy Department were included
in the competitive classified service. Agger, The Governinent and Its Employees (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 1109, 1113.
65. Theodore Roosevelt refused to permit the establishment of a closed shop in the
Government Printing Office, 20 REP. CIvIL SMnv. CoMM. (1904) 148-50; see also Op.
Atty. Gen. Minn., Feb. 28, 1940, 6 LAB. Rn-. Rn'. 83 (1940); 27 Ors. A'r. Gun. Wis.
30 (1938). Mayor LaGuardia has asserted that a closed shop clause in a contract for the
subwvays would be unconstitutional. 6 LAB. R.L REP. 171 (1940). The policy of the TVA
is that there shall be no discrimination against employees because of membership or non-
membership in an association of Government employees. TVA REP. (1936) 304.
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Historically, government employees have been placed in a class apart from
those of private industry, largely because of the concept of the unique quality
of public service. 60 Organization of government employees has been regarded
as an assertion of rights in derogation of the sovereign and as an improper
interference with administration and discipline of the public service.0 7 Despite
this attitude, unionization in the Federal Government has made rapid
progress with the assistance of that provision of the Lloyd-LaFollette Ad
declaring that membership in a union of postal employees, not affiliated with
an outside organization imposing the obligation to strike against the United
States, shall not be regarded as a cause for reduction in rank or compensa-
tion or as a reason for dismissal. 68 The policy of the statute, if not its terms,
has been so extended to all branches of the public service 9 that the legality
of an independent Government union may not be seriously questioned7 0
But in only a few instances has the right of federal employees to bargain
collectively, even in a restricted sense, been recognized by the Government."
66. The validity of the concept has been questioned since increasing government
participation in industry has destroyed much of the distinction between public and private
employees. ROsENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT WORKs (1940) 58;
Agger, supra note 64, at 1111. The concept prevails despite the belief that the Govern-
ment should set standards of employment relations. See American Fed. of Government
Employees ex rel. Donovan v. Johnson, 1 N. L. R. B. 24, 28 (1934). There may be some
basis for a distinction between fundamental and proprietary federal activities. See State-
ment of Attorney General Murphy, N. Y. Times, July 14, 1939, p. 4, col. 2.
67. See Annual Report of Postmaster General to Congress (1917), quoted in Wnr,
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1926) 385. Prior to the seizure of the communications systemg
in the World War, Postmaster-General Burleson stated that "if the telegraph and
telephone lines are taken over, the employees should not be affiliated with any outside
organization. The sole affiliation should be with the Government and no outside organi-
zation should be allowed to influence their action." N. Y. Times, July 5, 1918, p. 15,
col. 1. His discharges of union leaders were frequent. SPRO, THE LABOR MOVEMEN'r
IN A GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY (1924) 216-19.
68. 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U. S. C. § 652 (1934). This is the only national legisla-
tion dealing with the right of public employees to collective bargaining. Its potential
protection has not been realized. Westwood, The "Right" of at; Employee of the United
States against Arbitrary Discharge (1938) 7 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 212, 215.
69. This has been the assumption of most commentators. See MOSHER AND KINGS-
LEY, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION (1936) 513; SPRO, PROBLEMS OF THB Amu-
CAN PUBLIC SMIaCE (1935) 180.
70. Cf. Hogan v. Picard, 171 Misc. 475, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 873 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd
per curiarn, 258 App. Div. 771, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (3d Dep't 1939) (incorporation of
union granted over protest of illegality); 27 OPs. ATry. GEN. Wis. 254 (1938) (gov-
ernmental bargaining with union proper).
71. The deprivation of collective bargaining rights is justified under the power of
the State to protect itself and the community from threats to their common security. Cf.
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940). President Roosevelt has con-
ceded the right to collective bargaining only over minor matters where administrative
officers have some discretion. N. Y. Times, July 10, 1937, p. 1, col. 8. Mayor LaGuardia
has denied that government may be a party to collective bargaining in the ordinary sense.
N. Y. Times, April 18, 1941, p. 1, col. 2. The United Federal Workers of America
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Neither the United States nor any of its instrumentalities created pri-
marily to perform governmental functions comes within the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act.72 Statutes creating the TVA and a few other
agencies are exceptional in providing for collective bargaining for wages
and terms of employment.73 In Government shipyards, however, employees
have no collective bargaining rights.74  Limitations on working hours are
set by statute, but they may be transcended if additional employees are not
available when needed.75 While provision is made for grievance machinery, 0
civil service regulations do not purport to improve working conditions except
as to tenure and promotion.77 Wages are determined by the commandant
guided only by the statutory declaration that they conform as closely
as possible to those paid in private establishments in the vicinity. 8 Rates
of pay for certain special employment categories are prescribed by the Secre-
tary of the Navy.70 Although there is no general statutory ban on strikes
by Government employees,80 it has been argued that such militant action
would be "intolerable and unthinkable."'s The obligation owed to the public
to assure orderliness and continuity in Government activities is said to be
paramount. And many Government unions have expressty disclaimed the
right to strike or have declared that strikes are contrary to "public policy." 2
(CIO) Plan a Membership Drive Among Federal Ewplyees, id., Nov. 3, 1941, p. 21,
cols. 4-5.
72. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 152(2) (Supp. 1939). American France Line,
12 N. L. R. B. 766, 769 (1939) (no jurisdiction over Panama R. R. operated by War
Department). Cf. Panama R. R., 2 N. L. R. B. 290 (1936) (jurisdiction not considered).
73. Collective bargaining over -ages is also a regular procedure in the United States
Printing Office, the SEC and the Army Ordnance Department. ZISKI-ND, O:E Tuous-
AND STRIKES OF GOVERImIENT EMPLOYEES (1940) 197-98. The Act creating the TVA
provides for the payment of the rate of %%-ages prevailing in the vicinity to mechanics
and laborers. 48 STAT. 59 (1933), 16 U. S. C. §831(b) (1934). Collective bargaining is
used to settle this issue. On other matters, representatives of the employees have little
power, but they are given a hearing whenever an employment rule is to be altered. Agger,
supra note 64, at 1127.
74. Some strikes have occurred in Navy yards. Agger, supra note 64, at 1131.
75. The statute provides for the eight hour day and the forty hour week, with time
and one-half for overtime. Pub. L. No. 671, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 23, 1940) § 5 (a).
76. N. Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1941, p. 6, col. 2.
77. Comment (1941) 54 HARV. L. REv. 1360. Tenure is insecure even in the classi-
fied civil service. Agger, supra note 64, at 1114.
78. 12 STAT. 587 (1862), 34 U. S. C. § 505 (1934).
79. This includes the clerical forces, 35 STAT. 754 (1909), and drafting, technical and
inspection workers, 39 STAT. 558 (1916), 34 U. S. C. § 04 (1934).
80. See discussion of Lloyd-LaFollette Act, supra p. 292.
81. Letter from President Roosevelt to L. C. Stewart, President of the National Fed-
eration of Federal Employees, 1 LA. Rm. REP. 45 (1937); N. Y. Times, July 10, 1937,
p. 1, col. 8; id., Sept. 6, 1937, p. 14, coL 1. Accord; Attorney General of Michigan, id.,
Sept. 25, 1941, p. 19, cols. 1-2. Yet over one thousand strikes against the government are
recorded. ZisK-x, op. cit. supra note 73, at 3. Picketing against the Government is also
regarded with disfavor. Westwood, supra note 68, at 232.
82. Zisnw, op. cit. supra note 73, at 202-14
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Problems arising from Government ownership or operation may, how-
ever, be frequently solved by continuance of conditions of employment under
adjustments previously attained through negotiations between company and
union.83 Some protection lies in the declaration of the Selective Service Act
that its commandeering provisions shall not be construed to impair existing
federal laws pertaining to "employment standards."8 4 Furthermore, if opera-
tion of a plant is delegated to a private organization, few of these issues
will exist. The Government will then be in a position to exact concessions
that will not only satisfy the recommendations of the Mediation Board, but
will also preserve existing gains of the union. As an added protection, the
employees will come within the National Labor Relations Act.85
Taxation. Another factor significant in formulating a policy is the reper-
cussion on state and local taxation.80 Traditionally, the property of the
United States has been absolutely exempt from all state taxation in the
absence of express federal consent.87 If the property seized is operated by
a Government corporation, 8 state and local authorities have no power to
tax since otherwise an infringement of federal sovereignty by impairing the
execution of necessary power results.80 While taxation of a private agency
performing Government services is not generally regarded as taxation of the
means employed to execute the national powers,00 it is so considered when
the organization is the only means by which the federal purpose can be
83. N. Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1941, p. 17, cot. 4; id., Aug. 25, 1941, p. 9, col. 3,
84. Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept 16, 1940) § 9.
85. ROSENFARB, op. cit. supra note 66, at 59. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 2 N. L. R.
B. 759 (1937) (privately owned and controlled company, operating vessels owned by
United States under management contract with Government). Cf. Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Ass'n Calif., 14 N. L. R. B. 207, 210-12 (1939).
86. For general discussion of intergovernmental tax immunity, see Pond, Intergov-
'erunental Tax Immunity: A Comparative Study of the Federal System (1941) 26
IOWA L. REv. 272; Hervey, Judicial Limitation of the Excnptlion of Federal insirtuen-
talities from State Taxation (1938) 12 TEmP. L. Q. 291.
87. Lee v. Osceola Imp. Dist., 268 U. S. 643 (1925) ; Brown, Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity: Do We Need a Constitutional Amncdment" (1940) 25 WAsh. U. L. Q. 153.
88. The Defense Plant Corporation, a subsidiary of the RFC, is empowered to oper-
ate such a plant. 54 STAT. 573, 574 (1940), 15 U. S. C. A. §606(b) (Supp. 1940). See
Prentice-Hall National Def. Serv. 1126958 (1940). It is immune from state taxation, ex-
cept of its real property. Pub. L. No. 108, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 10, 1941) § 3.
89. This is the general theory of federal tax immunity. See McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 435-36 (U. S. 1819) ; Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 478 (1939).
90. Such agencies are conducted primarily for private gain and only incidentally
serve the Government. The court will consider the economic incidence of the tax and will
invalidate the tax only if a direct and substantial burden is imposed. This is unlikely
if the tax is levied upon the property of the agent. Taber v. Indian Terr. Illuminating
Oil Co., 300 U. S. 1 (1937); Thomson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 1869). Taxa-
tion of the federal means is illegal. California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. 1 (1888)
(tax on franchise of railroad secured from United States; railroad performed some
Government services).
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effectuated.9 ' Thus the property would be tax exempt if operations were
conducted by a Government department, and the wholly public -character is
not lost because the Government chooses to act through the corporate
medium. 92  Moreover, the corporate cloak may be lifted to expose the
Government's beneficial interest in the operations and the fact that the cor-
poration is simply an agent.
93
Rapid growth in the number of federal instrumentalities, together with
the increasing share of national wealth coming within their control,"' has
aggravated the pressing fiscal problems of local taxing authorities.0 5 The
difficulty of the situation has been increased by the failure of Congress to
permit taxation of corporations created for exclusive federal purposes.00
Furthermore, the liberalizing influence of the rule in South Carolina v.
United States,9 7 that state proprietary activities are not immune from federal
taxation, has not been extended to federal instrumentalities. 5 Local taxing
91. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 (1923); Lincoln County v.
Pacific Spruce Corp., 26 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928). The reliability of these cases
as precedents may be lessened by their great reliance upon the fact that the corporations
were utilized to facilitate the prosecution of the war. McGuire, Some Problems Arising
from Government Corporations (1937) 85 U. or PA. L. REv. 778, 792. But cf. Federal
Land Bank of Columbia v. Highway Department, 172 S. C. 174, 173 S. E. 284 (1934)
(license fee for automobile operated by federal instrumentality is invalid). See James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 163 (1937) (dissenting opinion indicating that
cases apply in time of peace also).
92. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Delaware County, 17 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928);
United States v. Lewis, 10 F. Supp. 471 (XV. D. Ky. 1935).
93. New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 542 (1928); King County v. Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 282 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922). This treatment of the corporate
fiction has been severely criticized. See Comment (1923) 36 H.Rv. L. REv. 737.
94. Comment (1931) 29 MIcH. L. Rmv. 894, 893.
95. Watdns, The Power of the State and Federal Goveniments to Tax One An-
other (1938) 24 VA. L. Rxv. 475; ROHLF .NG, CArER, WNsr AND Hmvzv, Busi.-'Lss
AND) GovE-NxYEINT (1938) 302. Government-owned corporations have been advised to
resist all state taxes except those which they are expressly authorized to pay. 33 Ors.
A=. Gsx-z. 2 (1934).
96. Congress may exempt a federal instrumentality from taxation. King County v.
Emergency Fleet Corp., 282 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922). The power to create a cor-
poration to facilitate the performance of governmental functions gives the implied power
to preserve the agency. Pittman v. HOLC, 308 U. S. 21, 32-33 (1939). But the prop-
erty of such corporations is immune unless Congress orders otherwise. Schnell, Federally
Owned Corporations and Their Legal Problems (1936) 14 N. C. L. RE%. 337, 344.
The TVA statute has no tax or exemption provisions. 48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C.
§ 831 (1934). The HOLC Act is a typical exemption statute. 43 STAT. 129 (1933), 12
U. S. C. § 1463(c) (1934).
97. 199 U. S. 437 (1905). See also Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934).
98. The Federal Government is one of delegated powers so that it is capable con-
stitutionally of exercising only strictly governmental functions. Field, Govcrmncnt Cor-
porations: A Proposal (1935) 48 HAav. L. REv. 775, 790. Since the Federal Government
is controlled by the representatives of the states, there is a political restraint on the
exercise of the tax power absent in the case of the states. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
1941]
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officials, confronted with the problem of a fixed bonded debt in the face of
a rapid decline in revenue,90 have found some relief in federal statutory
provisions for payment to states and municipalities of amounts equal to taxes
payable if the corporations were privately owned and operated.10 0 Agree-
ments negotiated pursuant to authority granted in such statutes have not
proved entirely satisfactory, and some state legislatures have acted to permit
local levies upon federal proprietary activities in spite of the questionable
validity of such assessments. 101 Representatives of both the TVA and local
governments have successfully urged Congress to pass a bill designed to in-
crease federal allotments to states and municipalities in lieu of taxes. 102 In the
case of the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, the Secretary of
the Navy has promised that the municipal government will be given financial
support in the operation of public services, 0 3 but it is doubtful whether the
Secretary's promise can be construed as more than an assurance that a request
for an appropriation will be submitted to Congress. In any event, some
conciliatory technique must be evolved to aid in the adjustment of special
stresses upon local tax structures resulting from federal commandeering.
10 4
If property is seized by the Government and leased to a private cor-
poration, state and local taxation may not be foreclosed. Income of a
lessee of federal property will not be exempted from state taxation if the
statute imposing the tax does not differentiate between businesses operated
by Government lessees and similar enterprises. 10 Regard must be had
U. S. 405, 417 (1938). The argument that the states will lose much of their tax revenue
unless federal proprietary activities are taxable has not been accepted. Alabama v.
United States, 38 F. (2d) 897 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (situation of South Carolina case
distinguished, concurring judge feeling otherwise), dismissed on jurisdictional grounids,
282 U. S. 502 (1931).
99. See Anderson, TVA-Some Tenncssee Problems (1940) 16 TENN. L. REV. 304,
306-07.
100. The TVA was authorized to make such payments. 48 STAT. 66 (1933), 16
U. S. C. § 8311 (1934). The idea was incorporated by the authority into contracts with
municipally owned and operated distribution systems. Pinney, The Tennessee ["alley
Authority, (1939) 18 Omz. L. REv. 273, 295. It voluntarily adopted the practice of payitg
sums in lieu of taxes to state and local governments that would make its total con-
tributions equal to taxes payable if it were a private corporation. N. Y. Times, Oct.
11, 1935, p. 35, col. 6. The treatment of the USHA is similar. 49 STAT. 2026 (1936),
42 U. S. C. § 422 (Supp. 1939).
101. The laws are "concededly invalid". Local Govermnent in TVA Area Faces
Difficult Readjustments (1940) 25 NAT. MuNIC. REV. 62.
102. 54 STAT. 626 (1940), 16 U. S. C.A. § 8311 (1941).
103. The promise is to be effective if permanent possession is taken. N, Y. Times,
Sept. 3, 1941, p. 7, col. 2.
104. Lilienthal and Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal
Govermnent (1941) 54 HAv. L. REv. 545, 600.
105. In Helvering v. Mountain Producers' Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938), where a
federal tax upon income from the sale of oil produced on property leased from the
United States was upheld, the Court expressly overruled Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257
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for the economic incidence of the tax and a showing must be made that
direct and substantial interference exists with respect to the performance of
an obligation due to the Government. 0 0 Such a showing will, however, be
difficult if the tax is nondiscriminatory. The Supreme Court has carefully
pointed out that such a tax is not a levy upon the property leased to the
private organization. But the burden of the tax may be considered too
remote to affect the Govermnent.107 The same analysis may be applied where
operation of the property is delegated to a private organization under a
management contract.Y0 8
Social Security. Government purchase or operation of manufacturing
plants may exclude the employees from the operation of the Social Security
Act.'00 The old-age benefit clauses of the statute expressly exclude "service
performed in the employ of the United States Government, or of an instru-
mentality of the United States . . . which is wholly owned by the United
States." 110 And the unemployment compensation provisions do not encom-
pass "service performed in the employ of the United States or of an in-
strumentality of the United States.""' Any contention that employees of
Government proprietary corporations are not employees of the Govern-
ment ' 2 is fruitless since such persons are expressly excluded from the
Act." 3 But a saving clause in the Selective Service Act may preserve to em-
ployees of the mooted Government corporation their rights within the Social
Security Act. The Act states that nothing in its seizure provisions should
be construed to withdraw state or federal provisions for "security" standards
of employees in commandeered plants.1 14 Operation of the plant by a lessee
or a contractor also means that the security rights of the employees will
not be impaired. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a
private corporation operating lands under a lease from the Department of
U. S. 501 (1922). In the latter case a state tax upon net income of a lessee derived from
the sale of oil obtained under a lease of restricted Indian lands was invalidated.
106. Cf. Helvering v. Mountain Producers' Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 3S4-37.
107. Cf. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 149 (1937).
108. For discussion of management fee contracts, see Comment (1940) 50 YAsn. L J.
266, 282--83.
109. 49 STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U. S. C. § 301 (Supp. 1939). See Waldron, Sodal Se-
curity Amendments of 1939: An Objective Analysis (1939) 7 U. oF Cm. L. RnW. 83.
110. 53 STAT. 1373 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. §409(b)(6) (Supp. 1940).
111. 49 STAT. 642 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1107 (Supp. 1940).
112. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491 (1920) (employee of Fleet Corporation
is not agent of United States within meaning of Criminal Code); Osborn v. United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 866-67 (U. S. 1824).
113. The mooted Government corporation is a federal instrumentality. United States
v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15, 18 (1923) (Fleet Corporation); United States v. Czarnilzow-
Rionda Co., 40 F. (2d) 214, 215 (C. C.A. 2d, 1930) (same).
114. Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 16, 1940) § 9.
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the Interior is not an "instrumentality" of the United States within the intent
of the Act, since it was engaged in business for profit on its own behialf.11
CONCLUSION
The legal and practical problems surrounding extensive commandeering on
a long term basis, while significant, are not insurmountable. And it is unlikely
that commandeering will be carried to the point where those problems become
most acute; our economic system remains fundamentally one of private enter-
prise and the Government may be expected to deviate from that norm only
to obtain vital defense materials. The immediate impact of the question of
commandeering of strike-bound plants thus involves only temporary man-
agement and control by the military.
In such a context problems of commandeering are substantially minimized.
There is no reason why the Government should not be able to supplant em-
ployers for the period of the emergency and carry on much as they would
during that time. Labor disputes could be met in precisely the same way
as though private management were in control. Troops, for example, could
be sent in when production was stopped. Local tax bills, operating and other
expenses might be treated as costs which the Government ordinarily incurs in
buying goods. Issues arising under the Social Security Act could be met
by temporary arrangements. Resolution of more complicated issues such
as the amount of and title to profits made during the period of Government
control, as well as the compensation to be paid for the use of the plant,
might be deferred until the crisis has expired. The position of the Govern-
ment might be analogized to that of a receiver who manages the business
for a limited period to achieve a specific objective and then relinquishes
control.
It might be argued that, as the trend toward a war economy progresses,
the feasibility of temporizing arrangements diminishes. But this will not
be the case since the need for extensive commandeering will vanish as the
nation becomes convinced that a threat to its security overrides all else.
115. Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358 (1939). The employer
was held to be within the unemployment compensation provisions of the Act. See
(1940) 8 GFo. WAsH. L. REv. 990.
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